Duration of loan arrangement and syndicate organization

What is the influence of syndicate organization on the duration of loan arrangement? I answer this question using the survival analysis methodology on a sample of loans from 59 countries over the 1992-2006 period. I find that syndicate size, concentration, reputation, and national diversity clearly matters for the duration of loan arrangement and therefore for borrower satisfaction regarding the speed of obtaining the necessary funding. A syndicate organization adapted to specific agency problems of syndication, with numerous, reputable, and experienced arrangers retaining a larger portion of the loan reduces the duration. The latter is also shorter when the lenders diversity in terms of nationality is weaker.Syndicated loan, syndication process, duration of loan arrangement, agency costs, reputation, experience, nationality, survival analysis

Bank Risk-Taking in a Prospect Theory Framework Empirical Investigation in the Emerging Markets’ Case

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the validity of some behavioral conjectures as alternative explanations of bank risk-taking behavior. We especially focus on the different valuation of gains and losses relative to a reference point, and the changing attitude toward risk conditional on the domain (gains vs losses) features (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). We follow a methodology based on Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) and the Fishburn (1977) measure of risk, applied to a sample of banks from emerging market economies. Preliminary results show that the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) framework could provide an alternative for explaining risk-taking behavior in the banking industry. Bankers located above benchmark levels, exhibit risk aversion. Although, further investigations are needed in order to consolidate our conclusions.Cumulative Prospect Theory, bank risk taking, emerging market economies

Are Bank Ratings Coherent with Bank Default Probabilities in Emerging Market Economies ?

In this paper we investigate the coherence between bank ratings and default probability in emerging market economies using scoring and mapping techniques. In order to achieve its disciplining role, the rating should be coherent with the default risk it summarizes and disseminate. This issue is particularly crucial in emerging economies where under-developed financial markets, banking sector accrued opacity, and inadequate regulatory, institutional and legal environment affect banker’s risk taking behavior and bank’s default risk. Scoring results show a correct quantification of agency rating grades and thus their coherence. Mapping results show a tendency of the rating to aggregate bank’s default risk information into intermediate low category grades.emerging market economies, default probability, bank rating, scoring and mapping methods

Capital Regulation and Credit Risk Taking : Empirical Evidence from Banks in Emerging Market Economies

The primary purpose of this article is to investigate the relationship between bank capital and credit risk taking in emerging market economies. We also investigate the influence of several regulatory, institutional and legal features on the relationship between risk and capital. We apply a simultaneous equations framework following Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Jacques and Nigro (1997). Our results corroborate the existing findings for US and other industrial economies, putting forward the impact of capital regulation on banks’ behavior. We also show empirical evidence on the role of the regulatory, institutional and legal environment in driving bank capitalization and credit risk taking behavior in emerging market economies.bank capital and risk taking, bank regulation, emerging market economies, regulatory, institutional and legal environment

Banking Environment, Agency Costs, and Loan Syndication : A Cross-Country Analysis

Bank loan syndicate structure can be considered as an organizational response to agency problems stemming from the syndication process. The banking environment also influences the syndication process. We investigate how syndicate structure is influenced by the characteristics of the banking environment, such as banking market structure, financial development, banking regulation and supervision, and legal risk. The results of a cross-country analysis performed on a sample of 15,586 syndicated loan facilities from 24 countries over a period of 15 years confirm that syndicate structure is influenced by banking environments consistent with agency costs minimization and efficient re-contracting objectives.Banking environment, Agency costs, Loan syndication, Syndicate structure.

Does Collateral Help Mitigate Adverse Selection ? A Cross-Country Analysis

We investigate whether collateral helps to solve adverse selection problems. Theory predicts a negative relationship between presence of collateral and risk premium, as collateral constitutes a signalling instrument for the borrower to be charged with a lower risk premium. However, bankers’ view and most empirical evidence contradict this prediction in accordance with the observed-risk hypothesis. We provide new evidence with loan-level data and country-level data for a sample of 5843 bank loans from 43 countries. We test whether the degree information asymmetries affects the link between the presence of collateral and risk premium. We include five proxies for the degree of information asymmetries, measuring opacity of financial information, trust, and development. We find that a greater degree of information asymmetries reduces the positive relationship between the presence of collateral and the risk premium. This finding provides support for the adverse selection and observed-risk hypotheses, as both hypotheses may be empirically validated depending of the degree of information asymmetries in the country.Collateral; Bank; Asymmetric information; Institutions

Credit risk management in banks: Hard information, soft Information and manipulation

The role of information’s processing in bank intermediation is a crucial input. The bank has access to different types of information in order to manage risk through capital allocation for Value at Risk coverage. Hard information, contained in balance sheet data and produced with credit scoring, is quantitative and verifiable. Soft information, produced within a bank relationship, is qualitative and non verifiable, therefore manipulable, but produces more precise estimation of the debtor’s quality. In this article, we investigate the impact of the information’s type on credit risk management in a principalagent framework with moral hazard with hidden information. The results show that access to soft information allows the banker to decrease the capital allocation for VaR coverage. We also show the existence of an incentive of the credit officer to manipulate the signal based on soft information that he produces. Therefore, we propose to implement an adequate incentive salary package which unables this manipulation. The comparison of the results from the two frameworks (information hard versus combination of hard and soft information) using simulations confirms that soft information gives an advantage to the banker but requires particular organizational modifications within the bank, as it allows to reduce capital allocation for VaR coverage.Hard information; Soft information; risk management; Value at Risk; moral hazard; hidden information; manipulation

Syndicated Loans in Emerging Markets

There has been a considerable expansion of the volume of syndicated loans in emerging markets in the recent years. We provide the first analysis of the determinants of the decision of banks to syndicate a loan on a sample of loan facilities from 50 emerging countries. We show the significant role of loan characteristics and of financial development, banking regulation, and legal institutions, on the decision to syndicate a loan. We support the efforts of authorities to increase banking competition and efficiency, and to implement binding banking regulation on capital requirement to promote the expansion of syndicated loans.Bank, Loan, Syndication, Emerging Markets, Logit Regressions.

How many banks does it take to lend? Empirical evidence from Europe

We provide empirical evidence on the determinants of the number of bank lenders using a sample of more than 3000 loans to firms from 24 European countries. Our testable hypotheses are built upon different theoretical frameworks drawn from the existing literature, referring to firm characteristics, strategic considerations, geographical distances, bank market concentration, efficiency of legal system, and development of alternative sources of funds. Our main results show that the number and the international diversity of lenders is increased by loan and firm characteristics which reduce agency costs, and by financial structure and legal environment characteristics which mitigate expropriation risk.Lending relationships, number of lenders, bank loans, financial governance, asymmetric information, Europe.

Collateral and Adverse Selection in Transition Countries

This paper tackles the question of knowing whether collateral helps solve adverse selection problems in transition countries. We use a unique dataset of about 400 bank loans from 16 transition countries. Our findings support the view of a positive link between the presence of collateral and the risk premium, which is in accordance with the observed-risk hypothesis. This suggests that collateral does not mitigate adverse selection problems in transition countries.Bank, collateral, transition economies.